The article discusses on Hegel's philosophy in the study of logic, nature, and spirit. According to the author, Hegel's Logic is a theory of all basic categories not in the forms of propositional thought in concept from the material or content. Hegel classifies logic in different doctrines which includes the doctrine of being, essence, and notion. The author reveals that on Hegel's philosophy of nature, he states that it is the study of the idea in its disaffection from self and (...) a dialectical process in which disaffection progressively sets aside. In the philosophy of mind or spirit, Hegel tells that mind or spirit represents the truth of nature and it has the self-externality as its presupposition and arises out of such externality. (shrink)

"What is value, moral or otherwise? What has positive value and what negative? Axiological ethics or moral value theory is concerned with such questions. In this monograph the author considers the writings of some of the most important exponents of axiological ethics, namely Brentano, Meinong, G. E. Moore, Hastings Rashdall, W. D. Ross, Scheler and Hartmann. He expounds their views clearly and sympathetically but not uncritically, and adds his own opinions about value theory. The reader will find this study full (...) of interest. It contributes to scholarship; is it widely known, for instance, how Scheler anticipated and criticised emotivists? Again, this study makes unpopular claims and argues for them cogently; it is the case, for example, that pp much attention has been lavished on the early chapters of Moore's Principia Ethica, which discuss the naturalistic fallacy, and too little on later chapters, which make Moore 'one of the prime founders of axiology'? In the last chapter Professor Findlay makes his own suggestions toward a theory of value and the reader has to consider the question: Is there a gap in modern moral philosophy which these suggestions help to fill?"-Publisher. (shrink)

First published in 1967, The Transcendence of the Cave is the second in a series of Gifford Lectures on philosophical issues, and continues the themes of the first series entitled The Discipline of the Cave. In the opening chapters, J N Findlay sketches an ontology, an axiology and a theology which are ‘phenomenological’ in the sense of Husserl, as they attempt to show that a ‘firmament’ of logical and other values emerges out of the contingencies of first order liking (...) and interest. The synthesis of these values in an object having many paradoxical, mystical-religious properties is also a necessary outcome of this ‘logic’. In the later chapters, the author attempts to construct an orderly picture of other worldly experiences and their objects based solely on the premise that these experiences must be such as to resolve the many philosophical surds that plague us in this life. (shrink)

More than one third of the human brain is devoted to the processes of seeing - vision is after all the main way in which we gather information about the world. But human vision is a dynamic process during which the eyes continually sample the environment. Where most books on vision consider it as a passive activity, this book is unique in focusing on vision as an 'active' process. It goes beyond most accounts of vision where the focus is on (...) seeing, to provide an integrated account of seeing AND looking. The book starts by pointing out the weaknesses in our traditional approaches to vision and the reason we need this new approach. It then gives a thorough description of basic details of the visual and oculomotor systems necessary to understand active vision. The book goes on to show how this approach can give a new perspective on visual attention, and how the approach has progressed in the areas of visual orienting, reading, visual search, scene perception and neuropsychology. Finally, the book summarises progress by showing how this approach sheds new light on the old problem of how we maintain perception of a stable visual world. Written by two leading vision scientists, this book will be valuable for vision researchers and psychology students, from undergraduate level upwards. (shrink)

First published in 1974, J.N. Findlay's classic work on Plato has now been re-issued.

First published in 2005. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Philosophical themes as diverse as language, value, mind and God are among the topics discussed in this book, originally published in 1963. Considerably influential, there are contributions on Time, Camrbidge Philosophy, Doedelian Sentences, Morality by Convention and the Non-Existence of God. They reflect a gradual move from a position where the influence of Wittgenstein is paramount, to a position where there is considerable criticism of linguistic philosophy and a growing interest in the approaches of Hegel and the phenomenologists.

During active vision, the eyes continually scan the visual environment using saccadic scanning movements. This target article presents an information processing model for the control of these movements, with some close parallels to established physiological processes in the oculomotor system. Two separate pathways are concerned with the spatial and the temporal programming of the movement. In the temporal pathway there is spatially distributed coding and the saccade target is selected from a Both pathways descend through a hierarchy of levels, the (...) lower ones operating automatically. Visual onsets have automatic access to the eye control system via the lower levels. Various centres in each pathway are interconnected via reciprocal inhibition. The model accounts for a number of well-established phenomena in target-elicited saccades: the gap effect, express saccades, the remote distractor effect, and the global effect. High-level control of the pathways in tasks such as visual search and reading is discussed; it operates through spatial selection and search selection, which generally combine in an automated way. The model is examined in relation to data from patients with unilateral neglect. (shrink)

This paper undertakes two tasks. It will endeavour, first of all, to establish that there is a difficult discipline called Absolute-theory - Aristotle called it First Philosophy or Theology - which builds itself around the concept of a unique something which exists in an unqualified and necessary manner, and to which everything not itself attaches, or from which it in one manner or another derives. We shall try to distinguish the different strands or strata in the conception of an Absolute, (...) and shall then consider the alternative ways in which such a concept can be developed. For though, if there is or can be anything Absolute, it is one and unique and without rivals or alternatives, there are for us a large number of alternative ways of conceiving of what is absolute, some of which are arguably better and less exposed to antinomy than others. And of course there is always for us the alternative of not conceiving or not believing in any Absolute at all. And we shall briefly glance at the great historical dynasty of Absolutes: the infinitely arbitrary, anthropomorphic, of the Judaic-Christian-Islamic tradition, the less arbitrary Aristotelian-Neoplatonic Absolute of Thomas Aquinas, the Substantial Absolute of Spinoza, the Leibnizian-Wolffian Absolute of which Kant made his Ideal of Pure Reason, the Upanishadic Absolute of Shanaracharya, the infinitely vacuous Absolute of Mahayana Buddhism, the Deistic and Materialistic Absolutes of the Eighteenth Century Enlightenment, the absolute Space-Time of modern physicists, the Aussersein of Alexius Meinong and the Logical Space of Ludwig Wittgenstein. If the construction of Absolutes is an unrewarding language-and thought-game, it is none the less one which practically all the more intense thinkers have tried to play. I shall next, in the second part of my paper, try to establish that Hegel is by far the subtlest and the most successful of all the Absolute-theorists. His whole philosophy may be regarded as an essay in Absolute-theory, in that it throughout does nothing but try out, modify or discard categories of thought and forms of being because they fail to measure up to an adequate conception of an Absolute. And in his vast rehearsal of categories and forms of being Hegel arguably works up to a conception of the Absolute which takes account of a far wider and richer array of issues, and forestalls a more varied assemblage of objections than any other exercise in Absolute-theory. Sometimes Hegel anticipates thought-moves that will occur long after his death: the moves, e.g., of John Stuart Mill regarding the Syllogism’s being a Petitio Principii, and inductive reasoning’s being really an inference from particulars to particulars. And it will be our contention, finally, that Hegel is by far the most successful of Absolutists, in that he, and he alone, has worked out a many-sided Logic which, whatever its imperfections, is the only sort of instrument with which Absolute-theory can be tackled. In arguing in this manner I shall be contributing to the main theme of this Congress, the nature of the Universe, for the Universe, I believe, is a very vague and degenerate sort of Absolute. (shrink)

Our target article discussed how emerging knowledge of the physiological processes involved in the control of saccadic eye movements provided the basis for a functional framework in which to understand the programming of such movements. The commentators raised many interesting issues in their varied responses that ranged from detailed discussion of the physiological substrate through issues of saccade control in reading. New evidence at the physiological level demonstrates that some elaborations are needed to the framework we proposed. Most clearly, the (...) spatial selection process operates in a manner different from our suggestion of an increase in activity in the salience map. Some commentators make the interesting and welcome proposal that the functional processes we outline may in fact be implemented with an even more unified physiological substrate (continuity between collicular fixation and build-up cells) than we envisaged. Extensions to the framework are discussed involving the planning of sequential saccades, saccades made in crossmodal situations, the influences of learning and memory, and binocular saccades. We consider carefully the commentaries proposing explicit attentional and/or executive processes in the programming of saccades. We integrate the comments of researchers investigating saccade control in neurological and neuropsychiatric patients and finally discuss whether the framework can account for saccades made in the course of reading. (shrink)

This commentary centres around the system of human visual attention. Although generally supportive of the position advocated in the target article, we suggest that the detailed account overestimates the capacities of active human vision. Limitations of peripheral search and saccadic accuracy are discussed in relation to the division of labour between covert and overt attentional processes.

The present paper is a very hastily executed attempt to provide a philosophical account of personality within the framework of a more or less Platonic ontology. I am writing it because I believe the conscious person, the “soul” as it would have been called in an earlier thought-dispensation, to be one of the most interesting and pivotal of cosmic structures, one which, if dealt with in a careless or reachme-down manner, as a side-issue or queer offshoot of things not conceived (...) in its peculiar terms and manner, will throw one’s whole cosmic picture and system of fundamental categories out of joint. The conscious person may be an extremely rare, transitory, fortuitously produced phenomenon—there are increasing grounds for regarding it in this manner—but its modes of operation and some of its basic logical properties are so very extraordinary as perhaps to throw more light on the universe out of which it arises than the indefinitely numerous, unconscious, impersonal things which surround it on every side and which will with some probability ultimately engulf it. I am also writing it because I have come to entertain the conviction that what absolutely and unambiguously is, is more of the nature of a universal, a subsistent, an essence, something which is a Nature or Character itself, rather than anything which transitorily or inadequately embodies or exemplifies or is a case of it, and because I wish to accommodate these two profoundly held convictions to one another. My problem is the one Plato dealt with whenever, as in the Phaedo, Timaeus, and other writings, he tried to see how Soul, the source of motion in the changeable world, and itself internally changeable, can stand to essences of which it does not make sense to predicate intrinsic change. And it is also the issue dealt with by Hegel when he makes conscious Spirit the carrying out into full reality of the eternal Idea, and when he goes so far as to identify the Ego, which is the center of the conscious person, with absolute universality and negativity in its purest, most intransigent, all-sublating form. (shrink)

First published in 1966, _The Discipline of the Cave_ is the first series of a course of Gifford lectures on philosophical issues.. J N Findlay’s lectures use the image of the Cave to show how familiarity is full of restrictions, and involves puzzles and discrepancies unable to be resolved or removed. Such philosophical perplexities may be a result of the misunderstanding and abuse of ordinary ways of thinking and speaking. They may also be a way of ‘drawing us towards (...) being’, providing proof of the absurdity of ordinary thought, speech and experience unless modified and added to in ways which may point beyond it. What may be called a mystical and otherworldly element may need to be introduced into or rendered explicit in all our experience in order to give a viable sense to the most commonplace human utterances and activities. (shrink)

I am both happy and honoured to have been asked to give this lecture on mysticism in memory of Leo Robertson, of whom I have many very pleasant memories. It was a delight to be wafted off to the Saville Club after a lecture here, and to discuss mysticism and philosophy on one of its many sofas. I am very sorry that this particular pleasure will not recur. Leo Robertson belonged to an old-fashioned climate of thought in which an interest (...) in mysticism was respectable, and a long stay in the East had confirmed him in these leanings. I myself have always been constitutionally mystical, feeling that certain kinds of rapture, concerned with work, beauty, love and a few other things, are the only things absolutely worth having. I dropped my mysticism for a long period, partly on account of certain disillusioning experiences in my ’twenties, and partly out of deference to the dry methods and doctrine that prevailed in British philosophy. Latterly, however, increasing age has restored many of my illusions and made me generally more tender-minded; also, seeing the completely nugatory accomplishments of purely unmystical analysis, I have found myself reverting increasingly to my original mysticism. It was very refreshing to talk to a philosopher like Leo Robertson who took mysticism with the complete seriousness I think it deserves—as one of the truly fundamental human attitudes—but who also thought of it as supplementing and completing, rather than as undermining and nullifying, what other less rarefied thinkers do. It was also refreshing to hear all his talk about an earlier Cambridge, where he knew Wittgenstein in the full brilliance of his personal beauty as well as of his intelligence, and also knew Moore in the golden period of his dialectic, before he became so very preoccupied with the minutiae of the English language. Leo Robertson was a complete and rounded philosopher rather than a hamstrung one, and knowing him has been a factor in strengthening my resolve to be a complete and rounded thinker too. (shrink)

This commentary analyses the quantitative parameters of Reichle et al.'s model, using estimates when explicit information is not provided. The analysis highlights certain features that appear to be necessary to make the model work and ends by noting a possible problem concerning the variability associated with oculomotor programming.

The background and purpose of this paper require some explanation. It is not the product of a New Testament scholar, able to weigh and balance theories as to date, origin and doctrinal background of the text attributed to St John, nor to assess the identification of its author with the beloved Disciple elsewhere mentioned or with the author of the Apocalypse, nor to consider his relationship to Gnostics or Stoics or Essenes or other influences in the contemporary Jewish or (...) Christian ambience. It is only the effort of one who recognizes in St John's Gospel, if read with an appropriate hermeneutic, a supreme mystico-religious document which can provide guidance at every turn of the spiritual life, but which, if read in another manner, becomes only the expression of a hard-line particularism, which is not less unacceptable in that it acclaims a particular standing in a special relation to another particular on which we all depend for our existence and for all our properties. Conceive of God, or the supreme object of worship, as a particular among particulars, and as much other than ourselves as other things and persons are other, and religious reverence becomes a repugnant form of heteronomous idolatry, wrought up, moreover, with the blind acceptance of a large number of historic and cosmic myths. But conceive of God as being something beyond category-differences, and which as much transcends particularity as it transcends any form of abstract universality, and which incorporates in strict identity all those values of Truth, Love, Beauty, Justice, etc. which are all simply universality in action, and which, moreover, as much transcends personality and personal relationships as it also may have in them its supreme expression, and religion and worship at once acquire a perfect sense and reference. (shrink)

In this paper I investigate two views of theoretical explanation in quantum chemistry, advocated by John Clarke Slater and Charles Coulson. Slater argued for quantum‐mechanical rigor, and the primacy of fundamental principles in models of chemical bonding. Coulson emphasized systematic explanatory power within chemistry, and continuity with existing chemical explanations. I relate these views to the epistemic contexts of their disciplines.